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■abstract (3-4 sentences)■ 
This paper examines the case for replacing joint income by individual income as the 
base for the taxation of two-earner families. It draws upon well-established economic 
theory to support the argument. This shows that individual taxation is superior to joint 
taxation (“income-splitting”) on grounds of both efficiency and equity.  It also briefly 
reports on important recent empirical work that shows that in Germany moving from 
joint to individual taxation while at the same time increasing the availability of 
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Executive Summary 
Part 1 of the Expertise surveys the theoretical literature on the comparison between 
joint and individual income as the tax base for couples. The early work, based on the 
Ramsey principle, established the superiority of individual income on efficiency 
grounds, essentially because income splitting equalises the marginal tax rates of the 
two earners in the household, while their labour supply elasticities are significantly 
different. This is largely because the second earner, typically a woman, has an 
additional margin of substitution, that between market and household work. More 
recent research suggests that individual taxation is very likely to be superior on 
equity grounds also.  
In most households primary earners work full time but there is a great deal of 
heterogeneity in second earner labour supply. Moving from joint to individual taxation 
shifts some of the tax burden away from low wage households in which the second 
earner has a high labour supply, towards those households with a high wage primary 
earner and a (potential) second earner with a market labour supply at or close to 
zero. Given the importance of household production as an economic activity, total 
household labour income is a misleading indicator of household wellbeing. Much 
more relevant is the sum of this income and the value of household production. 
Moving to individual income as the tax base is in effect an indirect way of taxing 
otherwise untaxed household production.  
This part of the Expertise also critically surveys a number of contributions suggesting 
that the efficiency arguments for the superiority of individual over joint taxation either 
do not apply, or may not apply in some regions of the parameter space of the 
models. In my view these papers are not successful in overturning the “conventional 
wisdom” of the earlier literature, for reasons set out at length in the Expertise. The 
papers by Piggott and Whalley (1996)1 and Corneo (2013), which claim to 
demonstrate the superiority of joint taxation, are based on assumptions which in my 
view greatly restrict the relevance and applicability of their results. Papers based on 
non-cooperative models of the household do not prove the superiority of joint 
                                            
 
1 References are given in full at the end of the Expertise. 
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taxation, but rather show that where the tax system is based on individual incomes, it 
may be optimal to tax women (second earners) at a higher rate than men (primary 
earners). In my view the conditions under which this would hold are not satisfied in 
the German economy. 
The second part of the Expertise surveys the empirically-oriented literature. There 
are several papers, using models calibrated on German data, which demonstrate the 
welfare gains of the switch from income splitting to individual taxation in Germany. In 
particular the recent paper by Fehr and Ujhelyiova (2012) uses a computable 
dynamic, stochastic, overlapping generations general equilibrium model to show that 
a switch from joint to individual taxation accompanied by appropriate policies to 
improve child care availability would increase both aggregate welfare and fertility. 
This model seems to me to represent the state-of-the-art in models of this kind, as 
well as being well-calibrated to German data. 
Finally, I discuss some studies from outside Germany. In particular, I searched for 
empirical work on the consequences of the move from joint to individual taxation in 
the UK in 1990. Unfortunately there do not seem to be any studies that address this 
change directly. The picture is complicated by this being one of a series of important 
tax/benefit reforms that took place over the late 1980’s-early 1990’s, while the UK 
economy went into recession in the 3rd quarter of 1990, with negative growth for the 
following year and a slow recovery thereafter. The raw data show that female 
employment remained flat over this period while male employment fell sharply. A 
study by Blundell et al. (1998), controlling for demand-side factors, found that labour 
supply elasticities of women over this period were high enough to support the 
argument that a reduction in their marginal tax rates would lead to a significant 
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I. Introduction 
The economic theory of taxation sees taxes as having two main effects: first, they 
distort the decisions people make concerning the activity being taxed, and secondly, 
they cause a loss of wellbeing, usually referred to as “utility”, because of the loss of 
real income resulting from paying the tax. For example a tax on employment income 
may cause people to reduce the number of hours they work, or choose jobs requiring 
lower levels of effort and responsibility, or even leave the labour force entirely, and 
these are usually called the “(dis)incentive effects” of the tax. Paying a tax will also 
obviously reduce how much one can spend on consumption goods and saving, and 
so make one materially worse off. Moreover, the structure of the tax system, the set 
of rules determining how taxes have to be paid, inevitably means in practice that a 
tax will have different effects on different people, and an important area of tax 
analysis in economics is to try to clarify how the incentive effects and effects on 
wellbeing are distributed across the population being taxed.  
These are the main factors that determine how a tax system should optimally be 
designed, as economists see it. We should try to find the appropriate balance 
between: keeping down the cost of the distortions to incentives on the one hand, and 
taking account of society’s views concerning the fairness or equity of the distribution 
of the burden of taxation across the population on the other. 
Although there is a very large economics literature concerned with analysing income 
taxation along these lines, only a small part of it is concerned with income taxation in 
the context of the family, despite the fact that the majority of taxpayers live in family 
households, defined broadly to mean households consisting of at least two adults 
with or without dependent children, or of one adult with one or more dependent 
children. The reason for this is that the body of economic theory that tax economists 
normally draw upon was developed for the case of a single decision taker, dividing 
his2 time between work and leisure, and using the income from employment to buy 
goods and services for his own consumption.  
                                            
 
2 In all but the most recent textbooks, the decision taker is always a man. 
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The obvious descriptive inaccuracy of this model was sometimes recognised, 
increasingly so as over the 1960’s to 1980’s family structures changed dramatically, 
with falling fertility and increasing female labour force participation. Nevertheless, the 
temptation was strong to try to analyse issues of income taxation as if the family 
could be treated as a single individual, so that standard methods and techniques 
could be applied. This is still the dominant approach,3 but at least over the past three 
to four decades some economists have tried to develop models of family decision 
taking and to apply them to issues in family taxation.  
The stimulus for this work, and its central theme, has been the issue of the choice of 
tax base for the personal income tax system, whether this is to be joint or individual 
income in the prototypical two-earner household. This body of work will be the focus 
of the present review. The following section outlines the main characteristics of the 
types of income tax system that are typically in existence.4  Section III reviews some 
theoretical literature on the arguments for and against these alternatives for the 
design of a family taxation system, while Section IV gives a brief discussion of some 
of the empirical work done by German authors on the costs and benefits of switching 
from joint to individual taxation, and Section V concludes.  
II. The Structure of Tax Systems  
The personal income tax systems of virtually all countries take what economists call 
a “piecewise linear” form. The type of income designated as the base of the tax 
system is divided into brackets, the lowest bracket is usually exempt from taxation, 
and then there is a series of increasing tax rates, called the marginal rates, that are 
constant within each successive bracket.5 The only apparent exception to this is the 
German tax system. Here, within the middle two of four tax brackets the tax rate 
increases linearly with income. This is an important feature of the tax system from the 
point of view of the present paper and will be further discussed below.  
                                            
 
3 See for example the most recent book by a leading tax theorist, Tuomala (2016). 
4 Tax theorists also consider forms of tax systems, usually referred to as “nonlinear taxation” that have no exact real world 
counterparts, the aim being to explore more general ideas of how tax systems could and should be structured. 
5 This is true of the formal tax systems. However in many countries, certain kinds of transfers, for example child benefits or 
support payments to low-income workers, are withdrawn as the household’s income increases, and this can cause effective 
marginal tax rates to be higher over lower ranges of the income distribution. 
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In the majority of countries, the tax base for two-earner households is the individual 
income of each earner. In principle, it is quite feasible to apply a different schedule of 
tax rates and income brackets to the income of each earner in the household and, as 
we discuss below, economic theory suggests arguments for doing so, at least in 
respect of income from employment. Alesina et al. (2011) have termed this “gender-
based taxation”. However, in practice it is the norm to apply the same tax structure to 
the individual incomes, having the result that second earners will often, but not 
always, be paying lower marginal rates than primary earners,6 to an extent 
dependent on the widths of the tax brackets and the amount of the earnings 
difference between the primary and second earners. However, couples with close to 
equal incomes will very probably be in the same bracket, in contrast to the case of 
gender-based taxation.  
A second important characteristic of systems with individual incomes as the tax base 
is that the marginal tax rate of one earner in the household is independent of the 
income of the other. In the remainder of this paper we will refer to systems in which 
the tax base is individual income but the same rate schedule is applied to each 
earner as “individual taxation”. 
Although not in the majority, some of the economies in which the joint income of the 
two earners is taken as the tax base, in particular the USA, Germany and France, are 
among the world’s largest. It is unnecessary to devote much space to define this 
system for a German reader. Its chief general characteristics are that by adding the 
couple’s incomes, dividing them by a factor, most usually 2,7 and then applying the 
tax schedule to the resulting income, the two earners pay the same marginal rate 
regardless of the size of the difference in their earnings, and an increase in the 
earnings of one person may raise the tax rate of the other. This latter effect is 
particularly strong in the German tax system, as opposed to the American, where an 
increment in the earnings of one person raises the tax rate of the other only if it shifts 
them into a higher tax bracket. Because, as mentioned above, the marginal tax rate 
                                            
 
6 The primary earner is designated simply as the person with the higher earned income. On average in the OECD countries 
around 80% of second earners are women. 
7 Of course there are differences in detail between countries, for example in France joint income is divided by a factor that 
depends also on the number of children, so-called family-splitting. 
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increases with joint income in the central two brackets of the German system, over 
this range any increase in one person’s income necessarily increases the tax rate of 
the other. 
A further important feature of joint tax systems is what is often called the “income-
splitting advantage”. A high income primary earner in a household in which the 
second earner has little or no income8 will: (a) pay less tax than a household with the 
same primary earner income but with a second earner working a significant number 
of hours, and (b) the same amount of tax as a household with two lower-wage 
earners working full time to get the same total income. This property of joint taxation 
is very important when we come to evaluate the fairness in the way it allocates the 
burden of income taxation across households. 
An important feature of the tax systems of the middle- and high-income countries of 
the world over the past few decades has been a significant reduction in the number 
of the tax brackets and a steady decrease in the marginal tax rates in the top 
bracket(s). A further important, world-wide phenomenon is that of “bracket creep”, 
whereby the failure to adjust the bracket limits in line with inflation results in an 
increasing proportion of the taxed population moving into the higher tax brackets. 
Both these developments, which have taken place against the background of a 
significant increase in inequality of pre-tax wages and incomes in many of the major 
OECD countries, are relevant to the discussion of the relative merits of the different 
forms of tax system just outlined. 
The above brief characterisations of the two tax systems reflect what economists 
perceive to be their main characteristics. The extent to which a tax system distorts 
incentives is usually referred to as the “efficiency effect” of the tax, and the way in 
which it determines the distribution of the tax burden across households and 
individuals is called its “equity effect”. We now turn to an evaluation of the systems 
based on the two criteria of efficiency and equity in the allocation of the burden of 
raising a given tax revenue across households. 
                                            
 
8 In the OECD countries, on average in roughly one-third of households there is only a single earner. 
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III. Evaluation 
In this section we compare, from a theoretical point of view, the efficiency and equity 
effects of joint and individual taxation, and also discuss the issue of tax reform, the 
question of what happens to equity and efficiency when we move from a joint to an 
individual tax system, since this is the type of change that is possibly of most 
relevance to the German economy. 
1. Efficiency  
The superiority of a system based on individual rather than joint income on efficiency 
grounds is reasonably well-established, despite some attempts in the theoretical 
literature to overturn that conclusion.9 The argument is based on a long-established 
principle of optimal taxation, the Ramsey Rule,10 in conjunction with some robust 
empirical evidence.  
The Ramsey Rule is based on the idea that the loss of wellbeing resulting from the 
imposition of a tax on a person’s labour supply is greater, the larger the amount by 
which it is distorted away from the level it would be at in the absence of that tax. It 
follows that the greater the distortion a given tax rate would cause for a particular, 
identifiable category of workers, the lower should be the tax on that category.  The 
following numerical example illustrates the logic of the Ramsey Rule. 
Assume that in the absence of an income tax worker A, who has a wage of 25 euros 
per hour, would work 160 hours a month, and worker B, with a wage of 18 euros per 
hour, would work 80 hours a month. A key piece of information is the responsiveness 
of each worker’s labour supply (hours worked) to a fall in the wage rate. Assume that 
every 1% fall in the wage causes a 0.1% fall in A’s labour supply but a 0.5% fall in 
B’s labour supply.11 Let a tax of 30% be imposed on both workers, so that A’s net 
                                            
 
9 For theoretical papers that seek to do this, unsuccessfully in my view, see Piggott and Whalley (1996), Meier and Reiner 
(2012), (2015), and Corneo (2013). 
10 So called because it was formulated by Frank Ramsey, the brilliant Cambridge mathematician and philosopher who made 
three fundamental contributions to economics, of which the Ramsey Rule is one, before dying at the tragically young age of 26. 
See Ramsey (1929). 
11 The values 0.1 and 0.5 are measures of the responsiveness of labour supply to changes in the wage, and are called the 
elasticities of labour supply. 
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wage falls to 17.50 euros and B’s to 12.60 euros. In Table 1, we show the post-tax 
labour supplies, gross and net incomes and tax revenue.12 
Table 1 about here 
We assume that 1530 euros is the total tax revenue requirement. Because B’s labour 
supply is much more responsive to changes in her (net) wage than A’s, the reduction 
in her labour supply is much larger in both absolute and proportional terms. 
In Table 2 we show the effects of differentiating the tax rates in the direction 
suggested by the Ramsey Rule, by imposing a lower tax of 15%, on B, and a higher 
tax of 34.5%  on A, which allows us still to meet the tax revenue target of 1530 euros. 
We see that in comparison to Table 1, A’s labour supply is slightly lower but B’s is 
significantly higher, and the overall falls in aggregate labour supply and gross income 
are significantly lower.  
Table 2 about here 
An alternative way of looking at this example is to suppose that we begin with a 
system of joint taxation in which A is the primary earner in a “representative 
household” and B is the second earner. Both pay a marginal tax rate of 30%, A works 
full time and B part time. Now change the system to one of individual taxation, with 
the tax rates as assumed in the example, where this representative household pays 
the same tax in total. Then the example shows that both earners can be made better 
off, because the gain to the second earner outweighs the loss to the primary earner. 
Essentially, we are trading off the two distortions: a small increase in the distortion to 
A’s labour supply and a large reduction in the distortion to that of B, with a gain to the 
household overall. 
What gives this example its practical significance is the fact that the elasticity values 
of 0.1 and 0.5 reflect the range of empirical measurements of male and female labour 
supply elasticities respectively. In fact, the estimates of the labour supply elasticities 
of “prime age in-work males” vary from 0 to 0.1%, while those of females vary from 
0.3% to more than 0.8%.  
                                            
 
12 The figures in these tables have been quite drastically rounded, but without changing the lesson of the example. 
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When the example is translated to the economy as a whole, it suggests that the 
entire economy could be made better off by a move from joint to individual taxation, 
with no loss in tax revenue, because of the overall reduction in the distortion that the 
income tax system creates. Thus, the Ramsey Rule and the evidence on male and 
female labour supplies provide the main pillar of the argument that there are 
efficiency gains in replacing joint by individual taxation.13 
However, an important fact, to add to the observation that female labour supply is 
much more sensitive to tax rates than that of men, is that whereas men, as primary 
earners, show a very high degree of uniformity in their labour supply - the large 
majority have full-time jobs and lifetime occupations or careers - female labour supply 
is much more heterogeneous, with, in the OECD countries, on average about one-
third in full time work, one-third in part time work with wide variation in hours, and 
one-third not in the labour force.14 
A sceptical reader may well therefore raise the objection: What happens in a 
household where there is only a single income, or a very low second income? Surely 
such a household will be made worse off, since the loss in primary earner’s income 
may well not be compensated for by a gain in that of the second earner.  
This point is both perfectly correct and important. Application of the Ramsey Rule 
only suggests that everyone in the economy could be made better off, but there may 
be losers as well as gainers if the tax reform is actually made. To take the argument 
further we need to clarify exactly who will be made worse off, and who better off, and 
also to discuss how society may judge the fairness of these changes. In other words, 
efficiency is only one part of the story, we also have to consider the question of 
equity. But before turning to this, we need also to consider some explanations for 
these important characteristics of household labour supply. 
Why are there these differences in male and female wage elasticities and labour 
supply heterogeneity? In a standard economic model in which a worker’s time is 
simply divided between “work” and “leisure” the answer has to be simply “tastes” or 
                                            
 
13 See Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) and Apps and Rees (1999) for details of the argument. 
14 There is however quite wide variation across countries, with the Scandinavian countries having much higher proportions in full 
time work, while in Germany and the Southern European countries these proportions are much lower. 
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“preferences”. For some reason beyond the scope of the model to explain, women 
react more strongly than men to changes in their net of tax wage rates, and many 
women simply prefer to stay at home and “consume leisure” rather than go out to 
work 
The idea that these important differences in male and female labour supplies and 
elasticities are simply due to tastes or preferences for leisure as opposed to work 
however is obviously unsatisfactory. Both theory and empirical work suggest more 
compelling reasons.15 If we view the household not as a single individual but as a 
family, going through what we could call a “family life cycle”, the differences in labour 
supply choices are due not to gender per se but to a basic difference in the roles the 
individuals play in the household. It is absurd to view all time not spent in paid work 
as “leisure”.16 Time-use studies show that time spent in producing goods and 
services for consumption within the household – above all child care, as well as the 
usual domestic chores such as cooking, cleaning, laundry, shopping and so on – is 
quantitatively more important (if we exclude sleeping) than time spent in “leisure 
activities”, and moreover there is significant specialisation in production within 
households, with second earners spending much more time on it than primary 
earners.  
It is this additional margin of substitution that second earners have, together with the 
fact that most of them are women, that is the primary underlying cause of the 
difference in male and female elasticities and in the heterogeneity of labour supplies 
across households. 
It is useful to look at this more closely in terms of the “family life cycle”, based not on 
the age of the head of the household, as is done in conventional economic studies, 
but rather in terms of phases through which a “typical” family goes.17 When young 
people form a couple, they do not usually yet have children and are both fully 
employed. If and when they decide to have children, the situation typically changes 
                                            
 
15 For a more detailed discussion of these see Apps and Rees (2009). See also Alesina et al. (2011). 
16 To the non-economist, it may seem unnecessary to belabour this point, but unfortunately economic theory is still dominated 
by the idea of the simple division of time between work and leisure, and the habits of thought that this creates.  
17 There are of course important variations on the “typical family” described here, most importantly, if couples decide not to, or 
cannot, have children, and if they divorce or separate. For the discussion of family taxation however, it suffices to focus on the 
life cycle described here. 
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dramatically, with one partner, usually the female, in the majority of cases reducing 
her hours of work or dropping out of the labour force entirely, at least until the 
children start school. Following the phase when the children are quite young, there is 
still a high demand for household goods, but many women also take part-time jobs. 
When the children have grown up and (possibly) left home, the mother has far more 
time available, but if she has not remained in the labour force over the previous 
couple of decades she will find it hard to find a well-paid full time job. Finally comes 
retirement. It is this life cycle pattern that basically accounts for the difference 
between male and female elasticities and labour supply heterogeneity. 
Within this basic pattern, there are of course additional important determinants of 
second earner labour supply choices. The phase in the household’s life cycle when 
children are young is of central significance because the decisions taken then on the 
labour supply of the second earner will have very important and persistent effects on 
her labour market opportunities – in terms of both wage rates and job possibilities – 
later in the life cycle. Probably the two single most important economic factors18 in 
the household’s decision process in this vital phase are: the availability, quality and 
cost of non-parental child care; and the tax system. 
The importance of the first factor has long been recognised in the comparison of 
female labour supplies in France and the Nordic countries, on the one hand, where 
high quality child care at subsidised prices is readily available, and in Germany and 
the Southern European countries, where such provision has historically been poor (at 
least in West Germany). This difference has been reflected not only in female labour 
force participation rates and proportions of women in full-time jobs, but also in fertility 
rates.  
It might have been expected, or even hoped, by policy makers that low levels of 
female labour supply would be associated with larger family sizes, but that has not 
been the case. The correlation between female labour supply and completed fertility 
rates across the OECD countries is actually strongly positive, with Germany, Italy 
                                            
 
18 Other relevant factors are: social norms affecting attitudes toward working mothers and participation by fathers in child care 
and household work; and the availability of all-day schooling. Social norms are not however immutable, they do change over 
time. In the Anglo-Saxon countries for example attitudes towards working mothers have changed considerably since the 1960’s. 
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and Spain having the lowest fertility rates and female labour supplies, and France 
and the Nordic countries having the highest. The problems this presents for the low-
fertility economies, for example in terms of declining populations and the challenges 
presented by increasing age-dependency ratios,19 seem to have now been 
recognised by policy-makers, at least in Germany, where the result has been a large 
expansion in pre-school child care provision. 
However, as this particular obstacle to female labour supply diminishes in 
importance, so the problems presented by the joint tax system will become more 
apparent. Quite rationally, when a young couple is anticipating starting a family, they 
will consider the financial consequences, including those arising from the change in 
time allocations that will be required – who is going to look after the child(ren)? In 
general, because of the gender wage gap,20 the loss of pre-tax income will be smaller 
if the female reduces her working hours than if the male does. Moreover, since her 
net-of-tax wage is generally lower under income-splitting than under individual 
taxation, because she is likely to be paying a higher marginal tax rate on her 
earnings in the former case, the argument for this is stronger under joint than under 
individual taxation. Then, for every hour she works the cost of bought-in child care 
acts as a further tax, which will typically be regarded as a subtraction from her 
earnings, since it would not be paid if she did not go out to work. And finally because, 
under the German system, the primary earner’s marginal tax rate may very well fall 
as a result of the reduction in their joint income, this acts in effect as a subsidy to her 
reducing her labour supply. Once the children are present in the household, this 
calculation, done in reverse, provides a strong argument against it being worthwhile 
for her to increase her labour supply.  
Under individual taxation on the other hand, not only will the gender wage gap be 
reduced, in after-tax terms, when the second earner’s marginal tax rate is lower than 
that of the primary earner, but in addition his marginal tax rate is independent of 
whether she works or not. Thus the problem of combining family and career, though 
never easy, is less of a burden under individual than under joint taxation.  
                                            
 
19 The ratio of the proportion of the population above retirement age to the proportion of working age.   
20 The difference between average male and female wages. 
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Moreover, it is not difficult to understand why this could actually increase fertility 
levels (provided appropriate child care possibilities exist). Typically, the levels of child 
benefit, either in the form of tax rebates per child or a straightforward cash transfer 
such as Kindergeld, are small compared to the full lifetime costs of raising children, 
and a second income, even after tax, can provide much higher levels of funding for 
larger families. Thus increasing female labour supply can present at least a partial 
solution to the problem of funding public expenditure in the face of increasing age-
dependency ratios, not only by raising fertility levels but also by expanding the tax 
base.21  
One can therefore argue that if society were faced with a choice between which of 
the two tax systems to implement ab initio, joint or individual taxation, their respective 
efficiency effects would very strongly favour the latter. The higher distortion caused 
by the higher tax rate on primary (mainly male) earners would be more than 
compensated for by the much lower distortion achieved by the lower tax rate on 
second (mostly female) workers.  
However, as mentioned earlier, societies with existing joint tax systems are not facing 
a tabula rasa. There would have to be a tax reform, and it is easy to demonstrate that 
as a result of this, some households are likely to be made worse off by a change 
from joint to individual taxation, namely those in which under the current system the 
second earner works very few hours or none at all.22 Such households will lose from 
the increase in primary earner tax rates and may gain little, if at all, from the 
reduction in second earner tax rates. Even if the economy as a whole gains overall, 
some people are worse off. Thus we must take into account the second set of effects 
of tax systems, those concerning distributional fairness or equity. 
2. Equity   
In 1990 the tax base for personal income taxation in the UK was changed from joint 
to individual income. The political pressure and support for this came not from 
economists arguing that this would bring about gains in economic efficiency, but 
                                            
 
21 For further discussion see Apps and Rees (2004). 
22 See Apps and Rees (1997), (1999), (2009). 
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rather from feminists and “women’s liberation” activists who viewed the existing joint 
taxation system as fundamentally unfair. Under it, a wife’s income was regarded in 
law as the property of the husband, she was his dependant, subject to his authority 
and power to take decisions on her behalf. This was criticised on the grounds that it 
limited her role in decision making, restricted her independence and worsened her 
position within the household. Thus, at that time, the argument for moving from joint 
to individual taxation was essentially one of achieving a greater degree of fairness 
and equality within the household.  
The modern economic theories of decision making within households, which began 
to be developed in the 1980’s,23 were consistent with this view. The degree of power 
or influence women would have in household decisions was viewed as depending on 
the strength of their “outside options”, as determined for example by their capacity to 
earn income, together with such factors as divorce laws and rules of division of 
marital property and child custody after separation, and also on their wage rates, own 
wealth and contribution to household income.24 On the whole, relatively little attention 
was paid explicitly to the tax system, with the important exception of Apps (1981), 
(1982). Nevertheless, we would expect that a tax system that improved rather than 
inhibited the ability of women to combine career with family would be conducive to 
improving the position of women within the household, working through the factors 
just listed. 
On the other hand, it must be kept in mind that the main function of the income tax 
system is to raise revenue to fund public expenditure, and there are limited 
possibilities in the design of its overall structure specifically to address the issue of 
the position of women, as second earners, within the household. For this purpose 
more specifically designed and targeted instruments are necessary.  
                                            
 
23 See for example Apps, (1981), (1982), McElroy and Horney (1981), Manser and Brown (1980), and Apps and Rees (1988), 
though earlier forerunners were Samuelson (1956) and Becker (1965). For later developments see Konrad and Lommerud 
(1995), (2000) and Basu (2016). See Apps and Rees (2009) chs 2 and 3, for a fairly recent survey.  
24 The relative weights placed on these factors vary among the different theoretical frameworks. For example, early models 
based on Nash bargaining theory placed most weight on outside options or “divorce threat points”, while later models took a 
more general approach. Apps, (1981), (1982) emphasized work-related human capital formation. Work based on Becker’s early 
theories placed great emphasis on the “sex ratio”, the ratio between the number of marriageable men and women in the 
population at any given time. 
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For that reason, we would argue that, once we recognise the broad truth that 
individual taxation is superior to joint taxation in its effects on the position of women 
within the household, we should move on to place the emphasis, when comparing 
the equity effects of the two systems, on the issue of the distribution of wellbeing 
across households. Here, we have to recognise the importance of three empirical 
phenomena, two of which we have already discussed at some length: the importance 
of household production; the across-household heterogeneity in second-earner 
labour supply; and the degree of inequality in the primary earner wage distribution.  
A strong intuition in support of joint taxation is that a household's wellbeing or 
standard of living is higher, the larger its total income from employment. This 
suggests that a move from joint to individual income as the tax base could have 
adverse equity effects because, in a tax system with marginal tax rates increasing in 
income, such a change can result in two households with the same aggregate 
income paying different amounts of tax, or even one with a higher joint income 
paying less tax, depending on the relative incomes of the primary and second earner. 
This would seem to violate the principles of both horizontal and vertical equity.25  
However, it is not just money income that determines a household's real living 
standard. We also have to take into account the value of the goods and services 
produced and consumed within the household. Where these are produced primarily 
by the (potential) second earner using time that could alternatively be spent earning 
market income, this untaxed contribution to the household's living standard may 
actually vary inversely with its total money income. 
We illustrate this with an example. In household A the primary earner has an income 
of 100,000 euros a year, and the (potential) second earner is not in the labour force. 
In household B the primary earner has an income of 60,000 euros a year and the 
second earner works full time for an annual income of 40,000 euros. Under simple 
income splitting the two households pay the same amount of tax.  
Suppose alternatively there is an individual tax system with two brackets, a lower tax 
rate of 20% and a higher tax rate of 30% and the bracket limit, above which the 
                                            
 
25 Horizontal equity: individuals with equal living standards or capacities to pay should be taxed equally. Vertical equity: the 
higher one’s living standard or ability to pay the higher should be one’s tax burden. 
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higher rate is paid, is 58,000 euros. Then household A pays 24,200 euros and B 
pays 20,200 euros, which therefore appears to violate horizontal equity quite 
substantially. Moreover, we could vary the example by increasing one or both of the 
incomes in household B somewhat, so that it has a higher income than A, while still 
having it pay less tax, thus appearing to violate vertical equity.   
These conclusions follow from taking total household income as a reliable measure 
of a household’s wellbeing or capacity to pay. To argue this is however to assume 
that the domestic output of the (potential) second earner in household A, which may 
for example include a large amount of child care, is entirely valueless. At the same 
time, much of the income of household B may be spent on substitutes for these 
domestic goods, including child care, to replace the time not spent in household 
production by the second earner. When corrections are made for these factors, the 
level of wellbeing or living standard of household A may be at least as high as that of 
household B. The higher tax paid by household A may be viewed as implicitly 
correcting for the much higher value of untaxed household production that that 
household enjoys. 
There is a further, so far unappreciated strand in the equity argument, which has 
become of increasing significance in the last few decades. This has been a period 
characterised by increasing wage and income inequality26 and falling top tax rates27 
in the OECD countries. Now, in such an economy, under joint taxation the possibility 
of income splitting by high-income primary earners imposes a severe constraint on 
the extent to which the overall tax burden can be fairly allocated between households 
with very high standards of living on the  one hand, and those that are in the low to 
middle ranges of the distribution of wellbeing on the other. Income-splitting could in 
fact be viewed as a means of tax avoidance:28 having the second earner substitute 
household for market work is a perfectly legal means by which a high income primary 
earner can significantly reduce his tax bill. A recent theoretical paper29 shows that 
                                            
 
26 See Atkinson (2015), Atkinson et al. (2011) and Piketty and Saez (2003). 
27 This very important development in the tax structures of high income countries is thoroughly documented in Peter et al. 
(2010). 
28 By tax avoidance we mean the use of some means to reduce one’s tax burden in accordance with prevailing tax law. This is 
in contrast to tax evasion, where the means used are against the law. 
29 Apps and Rees (2016). 
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given the current high degree of inequality at the top of the primary income 
distribution, ending the advantage of income-splitting to high income households by 
moving from joint to individual taxation leads to a more progressive tax system in 
which overall equity gains actually reinforce the efficiency gains of the tax reform. 
IV. Empirical Studies for Germany 
The construction of theoretical models is very important for organising and clarifying 
thought and achieving important insights, but in the end cannot be an entirely 
conclusive argument for important and far-reaching tax reforms. Careful empirical 
analyses based on high quality data are also indispensable.  
There have been a number of empirical analyses which quantify the consequences 
of changing the tax base in Germany, and which give overall support to the case for 
moving from joint to individual taxation. Noteworthy among the earlier studies are the 
well-known papers by Beblo et al. (2004), and Steiner and Wrohlich (2004), (2008). 
The short but important paper by Decoster and Haan (2011) presents a thorough 
analysis of the effects of switching from income splitting to individual taxation, and, 
using several alternative ways of representing society’s evaluation of the gains and 
losses to different household types, confirms the superiority of individual taxation. 
Finally, in a paper that represents the cutting edge of current research in this area, 
Fehr and Ujhelyiova (2012) considers the switch from joint to individual taxation 
combined with a change in the child benefit system. Here I give only a brief summary 
of their results.  
Higher direct or indirect transfers to families, such as would result from increases in 
Kindergeld,  increase fertility but reduce female labour supply in the aggregate. 
Replacing joint by individual taxation in a tax revenue-neutral way increases female 
labour supply significantly but also reduces fertility. However, a joint increase in 
fertility and female labour supply is possible if the government provides increased 
child care facilities funded by the additional tax revenue resulting from replacing joint 
by individual taxation. All households receive significant gains in welfare, with low-
skilled households benefitting more than high-skilled. This paper therefore confirms 
the results of the earlier German studies while significantly extending the depth and 
sophistication of the empirical analysis. 
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V. Conclusions 
This paper has compared and evaluated the economic effects of basing the family 
income tax system on joint and individual incomes respectively. It assumes in the 
latter case that the same system of tax rates is applied separately to the incomes of 
primary and second earners, and so in that sense is based on earnings and not on 
gender. The characteristics of second earner labour supply that account for the gains 
in both efficiency and equity that would result from this reform are, we would argue, 
based not on gender but on the role that second earners play in the household.  
The paper has emphasised that the relaxation of the high tax disincentives to second 
earner labour supply resulting from a move to individual taxation could make an 
important contribution to solving the problems posed by an ageing population, as 
long as it is accompanied by improvements in the availability of good quality child 
care. There are signs that this argument is receiving increasing recognition. 
An important new argument that has been advanced here emphasises the equity 
gains from ending the income-splitting advantage to high income primary earners. 
This tax avoidance possibility places a severe constraint on the ability of the tax 
system to allocate the overall tax burden fairly across households, a constraint that 
has become more apparent in the light of the growth in income inequality that has 
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Tables 1 and 2 
 








Tax paid Gross 
income 
A 17.50 155 2712 1163 3875 
B 12.60 68 857 367 1224 
Total  223 3570 1530 5100 
 








Tax paid Gross 
income 
A 16.40 154 2532 1330 3862 
B 15.30 74 1132 200 1332 























    
 
 
Prof. Ray Rees 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Dieses Dokument wurde im Auftrag der Sachverständigen- 
kommission für den Zweiten Gleichstellungsbericht der  
Bundesregierung erstellt. Der Inhalt des Dokuments wird  
vollständig von den Autorinnen und Autoren verantwortet  




Institut für Sozialarbeit und Sozialpädagogik e.V. 
Geschäftsstelle Zweiter Gleichstellungsbericht der Bundesregierung  
Dr. Regina Frey (Leitung) 
Brachvogelstraße 1, 10961 Berlin 
www.gleichstellungsbericht.de 
 




Rees, Ray (2017): Economic Perspectives on the Income Taxation of 
Couples and the Choice of Tax Unit – A Review of the Literature. 




lilienfeld visuelles gestalten, Berlin  |  www.lilien-feld.de

